The CCP becomes a single point of failure that can promote contagion. Losses from the default of a large clearing member at a CCP may spread to other clearing members. Losses can also spread across markets if the defaulting clearing member belongs to multiple CCPs for different asset classes, or if losses at one CCP lead to the default of clearing members that participate in other markets. The potential risks to the financial system are obvious. Clearing members include the largest and most systemically important banks.
CCPs are required to hold liquid resources to protect themselves against defaults of clearing members. Losses large enough to create ripple effects across the financial system are likely to be rare. But the growing role of CCPs in derivatives markets suggests the need to monitor the potential effects of these rare events on the system as a whole.
This brief proposes a framework for conducting such a systemwide stress test using information already available to supervisors. Reusing information already reported would avoid an additional burden on the CCPs and their clearing members. Three components are needed to evaluate simultaneously stress testing on clearing members and CCPs across markets: (1) testing scenarios, (2) evaluation of the profits and losses (P/L) for each clearing member in each scenario, and (3) analysis of the probability of default of each clearing member. For each component, this brief identifies alternatives, discusses their benefits and limitations, and makes a recommendation.
The brief makes three recommendations. First, use a common set of underlying factors, such as interest rates or equity prices, to generate stress scenarios. This approach offers flexibility and ease in generating a large number of scenarios. Second, individual CCPs already report to their supervisors the results of individual stress tests against clearing member default. Regulators could use the results from those stress tests to calculate P/L impacts on clearing members.3 Third, use default models that are consistent with the stress scenarios. This consistency implies that the same market conditions can be applied to defaults. U.S. regulators already have the information needed to build a systemwide stress test. However, carrying it out would require further cooperation among U.S. regulators, including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Securities and Exchange Commission, and Federal Reserve Board.
The Current Stress Testing Landscape
Representatives from international regulators agreed in 2012 on guidelines for stress testing individual CCPs, known as the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (see Figure 1) . 4 In 2016, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and CFTC separately reported the results of their first systemwide supervisory stress tests in their markets (see Figure 2) .
Individual CCPs
Individual CCPs carry out and report stress tests daily to their supervisors. The goal of these tests is to ensure that CCPs are able to continue operating in times of market stress. Stress scenarios include peak historic price volatilities, shifts in market factors that determine the price of contracts cleared by the CCPs, and forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions. 
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Focusing on the largest clearing members, the CFTC developed a set of 11 stress scenarios based on price changes and correlations across markets that occurred on dates with extreme volatility. The results showed each CCP had sufficient prefunded resources to cover losses of its two largest clearing members. The results also showed that clearing members are diversified among CCPs.
The CFTC stress test shared the limitations of the ESMA stress test, but considered a larger number of scenarios. Despite these limitations, ESMA and CFTC supervisory stress tests present a clear advancement in assessing the resilience of CCPs and clearing members.
Supervisory Systemwide Stress Test for CCPs and Clearing Members
A systemwide supervisory stress test for CCPs and clearing members should be able to assess the resilience of multiple CCPs and their clearing members across markets. Designing such a stress test must consider three key components:
1. a set of scenarios; 2. estimation of the profit and loss for each clearing member under each scenario; and, 3. determination of clearing member defaults.
Scenarios
The goal in choosing stress scenarios is to identify extreme but plausible conditions.7
For a systemwide stress test, identifying the appropriate scenarios presents a challenge. Predicting which scenarios would be the most stressful for the entire system is difficult. As a result, many scenarios may need to be considered. Fortunately, in the case of CCPs, this concern is not significant. Each CCP already carries out stress tests in which the P/L for the portfolio of each clearing member is calculated for tens, or even thousands, of scenarios. But combining these scenarios in a systemwide supervisory stress test consistent with the scenarios used by individual CCPs could be challenging.
One way to overcome this difficulty and combine scenarios across CCPs and clearing members is to calculate the P/L of every cleared contract using changes on particular calendar dates. The results can then be combined across CCPs. For example, changes over each calendar day during the previous five years could be used.
A limitation of this approach is that historical changes may not include conditions that are extreme but plausible. Stress tests by ESMA and the CFTC do not rely solely on historical scenarios. To ensure that extreme but plausible conditions are included, they construct scenarios based on historical information, information implied by the prices of traded instruments, and expert judgment. One limitation is that these tests consider only a small number of scenarios to represent extreme Factor models typically involve only a few variables.
To calculate the P/L of individual contracts, a model is needed to link the common factors to contract prices. For example, consider a CCP that clears credit default swap contracts, both for indexes and individual companies.9 Changes in the price of the credit default swap contracts are expressed by changes in the spread between the risk-free rate and the rate on the corresponding bonds. These changes can be decomposed into one common factor -the spread on the index -and one, additional, residual term for each contract. Given the distribution of the common factor -the spread on the index -and the decomposition into spreads of individual companies, any number of scenarios can be generated.
Factor models make assumptions about the joint range of future changes of the factors, rather than simply relying on realized changes. For example, dependence between the factors can be captured by using several statistical models, such as correlated normal distributions, log-normal distributions, or copula models. The parameters of the models are based on historical information, as well as information about future values of the factors implied in current market prices, and expert judgment. Scenarios are generated consistent with the distribution of factors. Once scenarios are generated, the proposal described in this brief would identify the scenarios that result in the greatest systemwide stress, and refine the assumptions underlying the distribution of the factors.
Profit and loss
The second component of this systemwide stress testing proposal is to calculate the P/L impacts. To aggregate P/L across CCPs and clearing members, a new systemwide approach would first calculate P/L for the portfolio of each clearing member for each scenario.
In existing supervisory stress tests, ESMA and CFTC use information on trading positions to calculate portfolio P/L. Knowing the portfolio positions in individual contracts, they calculate the P/L of portfolios by first calculating the P/L for individual contracts.10 ESMA relied on CCPs to perform this calculation. The CFTC performed the calculation and verified the results with CCPs. The calculation requires information on positions of clearing members and can be complicated for some of the cleared contracts.
This brief recommends a different approach: use stress test results reported by individual CCPs to calculate the P/L impacts on clearing members. The advantage of this approach is that it would not require position information. It would not place any additional burden 
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Stress test scenarios
Historical data + market information + expert judgement A way to address this problem is to construct approximate portfolios. To illustrate how CCP stress tests can use an approximate portfolio, consider a CCP that clears a single contract, for example, an index. A 20 percent decrease in the value of an index that would result in a loss of $2 million implies that the portfolio has a $10 million exposure to the index. When a CCP clears multiple contracts, more scenarios are needed, but the idea is the same. In that case, rather than solving for a single unknown in a single equation, one solves for many unknowns in a system of equations.11
The possibility of constructing approximate portfolios solves the problem of calculating P/L for a portfolio from stress test information when variables are changed independently. In that case, the P/L for the portfolio is calculated using the approximate portfolio.
The accuracy of either the interpolation or the approximate portfolio approach depends on the number of stress test scenarios available at the CCP: the more the better. Having many scenarios available would also allow for an evaluation of the accuracy of each approach. Borrowing ideas from statistical learning, one can evaluate accuracy using some of the CCP stress tests -the training set -to build the approximation. The remaining stress tests -the validation set -could be used to test whether the approximation matches the reported results.12
Default
The last component of a systemwide supervisory stress test for CCPs and clearing members is the determination of clearing member default in each scenario. Determining default is important because CCPs hold balanced portfolios. If clearing members do not default, CCPs do not have losses, no matter how large the movements in contract prices.
The existing approach used by ESMA and the CFTC does not use a model to determine whether default is probable. Rather, the Cover 1 and Cover 2 standards assume default of one or two clearing members based on the size of the exposures of the clearing members. ESMA and the CFTC consider variations for supervisory stress tests. For example, in the ESMA scenarios, the two biggest clearing members in every CCP default. In the CFTC scenarios, the biggest, two biggest, or all clearing members default.
A model-free approach may be attractive, but has a drawback in the difficulty of determining if defaults are extreme but plausible. CCP clearing members have bilateral exposures with other financial and nonfinancial entities outside CCPs. Clearing members also have assets and liabilities whose values fluctuate. In many cases, those outside influences might mean that a clearing member may face large losses in its cleared portfolio but not default. Given that clearing members are similar in many dimensions, multiple simultaneous defaults would likely occur in some scenarios. 13 To determine whether a particular combination of defaults is extreme but plausible, a default model is needed that is consistent with the stress scenarios used.
If assets, liabilities, and all bilateral exposures between clearing members in each asset class are available, they can be used to determine whether a clearing member would default in a particular scenario. However, such a complete picture of the financial system will probably not be available. An alternative way to determine simultaneous defaults is based on structural models of firm value.
In a structural model, the default of a company is determined based on information on liabilities and changes in equity value. Similar to the discussion on factor analysis for building scenarios, changes in the value of a clearing member company are decomposed into factors. For example, in the case of a large bank, a structural model could determine how the bank's stock price depends on interest rates, index credit default swap spreads, mortgage default rates, and the S&P 500. When these factors change in a stress scenario, one could determine whether the bank defaults by comparing the resulting company value to the face value of the liabilities.14 Determining defaults this way is compatible with factor analysis for scenario building.15
The proposal here uses a structural model to determine multiple defaults, not because it is more or less strict than the model-free approach, but because it is consistent with the stress scenarios. Supervisors may have difficulty determining whether defaulting the two largest members by exposure in every CCP is extreme but plausible in a given scenario. With a structural model, defaults are consistent with each scenario. In some cases, this approach would mean more firms would default. In other cases, fewer would default; but defaults would be consistent with each stress scenario.
Reverse stress testing
The proposal in this brief can serve to identify conditions that would lead to the largest systemwide losses -a systemwide reverse stress test. Losses depend on clearing member defaults and changes in market prices. If many scenarios are available, the scenarios with the largest losses may be a reasonable approximation. An alternative is to search for conditions that lead to the largest losses iteratively, using information from the existing scenarios. However, searching for the worst scenarios iteratively, with the help of CCPs, could alert CCPs to the focus areas of supervisors. This concern provides an additional reason to calculate the P/L of the portfolios of clearing members using stress test results, rather than rely on CCPs to calculate or verify P/L estimates using clearing-member positions.
Accounting for reduced liquidity and auction failure
A systemwide stress test should also include adjustments for market liquidity when a clearing member holds a very large portfolio. To illustrate this problem, consider a situation when a clearing member defaults while holding 30 percent of the outstanding positions in a particular market. The size of such a portfolio may be many times the average daily, or even weekly, market trading volume. Although CCPs use auctions to avoid liquidating large positions of defaulting members in the open market at times of stress, transferring a position of this size is likely to have an additional price impact beyond that reflected in historical experience. Liquidity adjustments must reflect consideration of the size of the portfolio of the defaulting member relative to the market volume and to the exposures of surviving clearing members.
Liquidity adjustments must also reflect consideration of whether the transfer auction after a clearing member default may fail. For example, if winning the auction results in the violation of a requirement that clearing members must fulfill, clearing members may not participate in the auction. If the auction fails, the position may need to be liquidated in a stressed marketplace, and a larger adjustment may be needed.
Conclusion
This brief proposes a framework for supervisors to carry out a systemwide stress test of CCPs and clearing members. It requires three changes to the current tests: (1) generating a large number of scenarios using a factor analysis technique, (2) using existing stress test results to calculate P/L for a clearing member's portfolio for each scenario, and (3) using a structural default model to determine defaults consistent with the stress scenarios. These changes do not require additional information beyond what is already available to CCP supervisors. The framework can turn the results of existing, CCP-specific stress tests into a systemwide stress test if supervisors of different CCPs collaborate and share the data provided by the CCPs they supervise. 
